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Abstract
Complex socioeconomic networks such as information, finance and even terrorist networks need resilience to cascades - to
prevent the failure of a single node from causing a far-reaching domino effect. We show that terrorist and guerrilla networks
are uniquely cascade-resilient while maintaining high efficiency, but they become more vulnerable beyond a certain
threshold. We also introduce an optimization method for constructing networks with high passive cascade resilience. The
optimal networks are found to be based on cells, where each cell has a star topology. Counterintuitively, we find that there
are conditions where networks should not be modified to stop cascades because doing so would come at a
disproportionate loss of efficiency. Implementation of these findings can lead to more cascade-resilient networks in many
diverse areas.
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Introduction
Cascades are ubiquitous in complex networks and they have
inspired much research in modeling, prediction and mitigation
[1–10]. For example, since many infectious diseases spread over
contact networks a single carrier might infect other individuals
with whom she interacts. The infection might then propagate
widely through the network, leading to an epidemic. Even if no
lives are lost, recovery may require both prolonged hospitalizations
and expensive treatments. Similar cascade phenomena are found
in other domains such as power distribution systems [11–13],
computer networks such as ad-hoc wireless networks [7], financial
markets [14,15] and socio-economic systems [16]. A particularly
interesting class are ‘‘dark’’ or clandestine social networks, such as
terrorist networks, guerrilla groups [17], espionage and crime rings
[18,19]. In such networks if one of the nodes (i.e. individuals) is
captured by law enforcement agencies, he may betray all the nodes
connected to him leading to their likely capture.
Dark networks are therefore designed to operate in conditions of
intense cascade pressure. As such they might serve as useful
prototypes of networks that are cascade-resilient because of their
connectivitystructure (topology)alone.Their nodesareoftenplaced
in well-defined cells - closely-connected subnetworks with only
sparse connections to the outside (for an example from World War
II see Fig. 1) [20]. The advantages of cells are thought to be that the
riskfrom the capture of any personis mostly limited to hisor her cell
mates, thereby protecting the rest of the network [21,22]. Modern
terrorist groups retain this cellular structure, but increasingly use
networks made of components with no connections between them,
thus caging cascades within each component [23–25].
To represent networks from different domains, this paper will use
simple unweighted graphs. This approach offers simplicity and can
employ tools from the well-developed field of graph theory. A
simplification is also unavoidable given the lackof data on networks,
especially on dark networks where only the connectivity is known, if
that. Ultimately through, models of networks, especially dark
networks must consider their evolving nature, fuzzy boundaries and
multiplicities of node classes and diverse relationships.
Fortunately, the loss of information involved in representing
networks as simple rather than as weighted graphs could be
evaluated. In the File S1, we consider two unusually rich data sets
where the edges could be assigned weights. We find that the error
in using simple graphs has no systematic bias and is usually small.
Evaluating Cascade Resilience of Networks
Our preliminary task is to compare the cascade resilience of
networks from different domains. We will see that dark networks
are indeed more successful in the presence of cascades than other
complex networks. Their success stems not from cascade resilience
alone but from balancing resilience with efficiency (a measure of
their ability to serve their mission).
We will consider a particular type of cascade resilience and a par-
ticular definition of efficiency. For resilience we will use a probabi-
folistic process known as ‘‘SIR’’ (susceptible-infected-recovered).In SIR
any failed (captured) node leads to the failure of each neighboring node
independently with probability t [26]. Using the SIR model, resilience
R(G) could be defined as the average fraction of the network that does
not fail in the cascade. Efficiency W(G) is also a function of the
connectivity structure, and could be defined based on the distances
between all pairs of nodes in the graph (see the Methods section for
exact expressions.)
Observe that the most cascade-resilient network is the network
with no edges (hence no cascades can propagate), but it is also the
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efficiency will be in opposition, requiring trade-offs. Just as
disconnected networks are resilient and inefficient, highly-efficient
networks such as densely-connected graphs are likely to have low
resilience (for a historic example see [27].)
Define the overall ‘‘fitness’’, F(G), of a network by aggregating
resilience and efficiency through a weight parameter r:
F(G)~rR(G)z(1{r)W(G):
The parameter r depends on the application and represents the
cost of restoring the network after a cascade - from light (r?0)t o
catastrophic (r?1). It is possible to include in fitness other metrics
such as construction cost.
We will compare the fitnesses of several complex networks,
including communication, infrastructure and scientific networks to
the fitnesses of dark networks. The class of dark networks will be
represented by three networks: the 9/11, 11M and FTP networks.
The 9/11 network links the group of individuals who were directly
involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and
Washington, DC [28]. Similarly the 11M network links those
responsible for the March 11, 2004 train attacks in Madrid [23].
Both 9/11 and 11M were constructed from press reports of the
attacks. Edges in those networks connect two individuals who
worked with each other in the plots [23,28]. The FTP network is
an underground group from World War II (Fig. 1), whose network
was constructed by the author from a historical account [20].
Figure 2 shows that the dark networks attain the highest fitness
values of all networks, except for extreme levels of cascade risk
(tw0:6). This is to be expected: only 11M, 9/11, and the FTP
networks have been designed with cascade resilience as a significant
criterion - a property that makes them useful case studies. For high
cascade risks (tw0:6) the CollabNet network exceeds the fitnesses of
the dark networks. CollabNet was drawn by linking scientists who
co-authored a paper in the area of network science [29]. It achieved
high fitness because it is partitioned into research groups that have
no publications with outside scientists. Like some terrorist networks,
it is separated into entirely disconnected cells.
The 9/11 and the 11M networks are very successful for low
values of t (v0:2), but then rapidly deteriorate because of a jump
in the extent of cascades - the so-called percolation transition [30].
Past this threshold, cascades start affecting a large fraction of the
network, resilience collapses and the fitness declines rapidly. The
pattern of onset of failure can be clearly seen in most of the
networks. For violent secret societies this transition means that the
network might be initially hard to defeat, but there is a point after
which efforts against it start to pay off. Because t is representative
of the security environment, the 9/11 network is found to be
relatively ill-adapted to the more stringent security regime
implemented after the attacks. Indeed, it is likely that the 9/11
attacks would have been thwarted under the current security
regime since some of the nodes were captured before the attacks,
but not interrogated in time to discover and apprehend the rest of
the network [31]. In contrast, the cellular tree hierarchy of the
FTP network is more suitable for an intermediate range of cascade
risks. However, the pair-wise distances in it are too long to provide
high efficiency. Therefore, its fitness is comparatively poor in the
very low and very high values of t.
Designing Networks
The success of dark networks must be due to structural elements
of those networks, such as cells. If identified, those elements could
be used to design more resilient networks and to upgrade existing
ones. Thus, by learning how dark networks organize, it will be
possible to make networks such as communication systems,
financial networks, and others more resilient and efficient.
Those identification and design problems are our next task. We
propose to solve both using an approach based on discrete
optimization. Let a set of graphs G be called a ‘‘network design’’ if
all the networks in it share a structural element. Since dark
networks are often based on dense cliques, we consider a design
where all the networks consist of one or multiple cliques. We
consider also designs based on star-like cells, cycle-based cells and
more complex patterns (see Fig. 3 and SI for the exact set of
networks.)
In the first step we will find the most successful network within
each design. Namely, consider an optimization problem where the
decision variable is the topology G of a simple graph taken from a
design G. The objective is the fitness F(G):
max
G[G
F(G): ð1Þ
In the second step we will compare the fitnesses across designs,
thus identifying the topological feature with the highest fitness (e.g.
star vs. clique).
Figure 1. The French World-War II underground network Francs-tireurs et Partisans (FTP) reconstructed by the author based on the
account in [20]. Its organizational unit was the combat group (A). In an idealized case, nor always followed, this was divided into two ‘‘teams’’ of
three fighters, where leader L1 was in overall command and in command of team 1. His lieutenant, L2, led team 2 and assumed overall command if L1
was captured. The small degree of the nodes ensured that the capture of any one node did not risk the exposure of a significant fraction of the
organization. Each ‘‘group’’ is in a command hierarchy (B) where 3 groups (bottom-level nodes) made a ‘‘section’’, 3 sections made a ‘‘company’’, and
finally 3 companies made a ‘‘battalion’’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.g001
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introduces a method for designing cascade-resilient networks for
applications such as vital infrastructure networks. To apply this to a
given application, one must make the design G the set of all feasible
networks in that domain, to the extent possible by computational
constraints. In the area of terrorist networks, the model is closely
related to the game-theoretic work of Lindelauf et al. [22,32].
A complementary approach is to consider the multi-objective
optimization problem in which R(G) and W(G) are maximized
simultaneously:
max
G[G
R(G),W(G) fg : ð2Þ
The multi-objective approach cannot find the optimal network but
instead produces the Pareto frontier of each design - the set of
network configurations that cannot be improved without sacrific-
ing either efficiency or resilience. The decision maker can use the
Figure 2. Fitnesses of various networks at r~0:51 and various values of t. 11M is the network responsible for the March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid
(70 nodes, 241 edges). 9/11 [28]is the network responsible for the 9/11 attacks (62 nodes, 152 edges).CollabNet [29]is a scientific co-authorship network in the area
of network science (1589 nodes, 2742 edges). E-Mail [37] is a university’s e-mail contact network, showing its organizational structure (1133 nodes, 5452 edges). FTP
is the network in Fig. 1 (174 nodes, 300 edges). Gnutella [38,39] is a snapshot of the peer-to-peer network (6301 nodes, 20777 edges). Internet AS [40] is a snapshot
of the Internet at the autonomous system level (26475 nodes, 53381 edges). Except for tw0:6 dark networks (11M, 9/11 and FTP) attain the highest fitness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.g002
Figure 3. Graphs illustrating the 6 network designs. Cliques (A), Stars (B), Cycles (C), Connected Cliques (D), Connected Stars (E), and Erdos-
Renyi ‘‘ER’’ (F). Each design is configured by just one or two parameters (the number of individuals per cell and/or the random connectivity). This
enables rapid solution of the optimization problem. In computations the networks were larger (n~180 nodes).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.g003
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Results
Optimal Network
The first set of experiments compares the designs against each
other under different cascade risks (t), Fig. 4. At each setting of t,
each design is optimized to its best configuration, i.e. the best cell
size and connectivity, if applicable. The curves indicate the fitness
of the optimal network in each design. Typically at each t the
optimal network is different from the optimal network at another
t. Observe that within each design, as t increases the fitness
decreases - one cannot win when fighting cascades, only delay (see
SI for proof.) In certain applications it is possible to invest in
reducing the cascade propagation probability, t. Then the curves
in Fig. 4 could also be viewed as expressing the gain from efforts to
reduce cascades by reducing t and also adapting the network
structure. If the slope is steep then the gains are large.
Comparing designs to each other reveals that Connected Stars
is superior to all others in fitness (Fig. 4). The design also
outperforms any of the empirical networks in Fig. 2 in part
because for each value of t we selected the optimal network. The
simpler Stars design is almost as fit, deteriorating only at extreme
ranges of t. The rankings of the designs are of course dependent
on the parameter values, but not strongly (see SI for proof.) Star-
like designs are successful because the central node in a star acts as
a cascade blocker while keeping the average distance in the star
short (*2). Only for sufficiently low r, the Cliques, Connected
Cliques and Connected Stars designs are superior to the Stars
design. For such values of r efficiency is the dominant contributor
to fitness. High weighting for efficiency benefits the former designs
where efficiency can be 1 by constructing a fully connected
(complete) graph (see SI for analytic results.) In the star design
efficiency is lower, reaching *
1
2
(when all nodes are placed in a
single large star).
It has been long conjectured that cells provide dark networks
with high resilience. Indeed, this is probably the reason why we
found that dark networks have higher fitnesses than other
networks. But cells also reduce the efficiency of a network since
they isolate nodes from each other. To rigorously determine the
net effect of cells, we compare the ER design (random graphs)
to the Connected Stars design. ER is a strict subset of Connect-
ed Stars but only Connected Stars has cells. Therefore it is not-
able that Connected Stars has a higher fitness than ER, often
significantly so. Indeed, cells must be the cause of higher
fitness because cells are the only feature in Connected Stars that
ER lacks.
Properties of Optimal Networks
Many properties of the optimal networks such as resilience,
efficiency and edge density show rapid phase transitions as r is
changed. For example, in the Cliques design when rv0:5 the
optimal network has high density that maximizes efficiency,
whereas for rw0:5 it is sparse and maximizes resilience (Fig. 5).
Intuition may suggest that the networks grow more sparse as
cascade risk grows. Instead, the trend was non-monotonic (Fig. 5).
For t&0 and rv0:5 Cliques, Connected Cliques and Connected
Stars became denser, instead of sparser, and for them the most
sparse networks were formed in the intermediate values of t where
the optimal networks achieve both relatively high resilience and
high efficiency. At higher t values, when rv0:5 it pays to sacrifice
resilience because fitness is increased when efficiency is made
larger through an equal or lesser sacrifice in resilience. The Stars
design does not show a transition at r~0:5 because it is hard to
increase efficiency with this design.
Figure 4. Fitness at r~0:51 of various network designs. The Connected Stars design is the best design at all cascade risks, t. Cliques and
Connected Cliques are competitive only for extreme ranges of t. The superiority of Connected Stars over the ER (random graph) confirms the
hypothesis that cells give fitness gains against cascades. The fitness of a design at each value of t is defined as the fitness of the optimal configuration
(network ensemble) within that design.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.g004
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A complementary perspective on each design is found from its
Pareto frontier of resilience and efficiency (Fig. 6). Typically a
design is dominant in a part of the Resilience-Efficiency plane but
not all of it. The Stars and Connected Stars designs can access
most of the high resilience-low efficiency region. In contrast, the
Cliques and Connected Cliques can make networks in the medium
resilience-high efficiency regions.
The sharp phase transitions discussed earlier are seen clearly:
along most of the frontiers, if we trace a point while decreasing
resilience, there is a threshold at which a small sacrifice in
resilience gives a major gain of efficiency. More generally, consider
the points where the frontier is smooth. By taking two nearby
networks on the frontier one can define a rate of change of
efficiency with respect to resilience: j
DW
DRj. The ratio can be used
to optimize the network without using the parameter r. When
j
DW
DRj&1 the network optimizer should choose to reduce to the
resilience of the network in order to achieve great gains in
efficiency; when j
DW
DRj%1 efficiency should be sacrificed to
improve resilience.
Figure 5. Average degree in the optimal configuration of each design. At r~0:49 (A) the optimization prefers networks that have high
efficiency while at r~0:51 (B) the preference is for resilience. In (B) the average degree diminishes monotonically to compensate for increasing
cascade risk. In (A) most designs have a threshold t at which they jump back to a completely-connected graph because structural cascade resilience
becomes too expensive in terms of efficiency.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.g005
Figure 6. The Pareto frontiers of various network designs (t~0:4). The configurations of the Connected Stars design dominate over other
designs when the network must achieve high resilience. However, designs based on cliques are dominant when high efficiency is required. Several
designs show sharp transitions where at a small sacrifice of efficiency it is possible to achieve large increases in cascade resilience.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.g006
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The analysis above considered both empirical networks and
synthetic ones. The latter were constructed to achieve structural
cascade resilience and efficiency. In contrast, in many empirical
networks the structure emerges through an unplanned growth
process or results from optimization to factors such as cost rather
than blocking cascades. Without exception the synthetic networks
showed higher fitness values despite the fact that they were based
on very simple designs. This suggests that network optimization
can significantly improve the fitness and cascade resilience of
networks. It means that such an optimization process can indeed
be an effective method for designing a variety of networks and for
protecting existing networks from cascades.
Many empirical networks also have power-law degree distributions
[26]. Unfortunately, this feature significantly diminishes their cascade
resilience: the resulting high-degree hubs make the networks
extremely vulnerable to cascades once t is slightly larger than 0 [1,2].
In some successful synthetic networks the density of edges
increased when the cascade risk t was high. This phenomenon has
interesting parallels in non-violent social movements which are
often organized openly rather than as secret underground cells even
under conditions of severe state repression [33]. This openness
greatly facilitates recruitment and advocacy, justifying the addition-
al risk to the participants, just like the sacrifice of resilience to gain
higher efficiency is justified under rv0:5 conditions.
There are other important applications of this work, such as the
design of power distribution systems. For power networks, the
definition of resilience and efficiency will need to be changed. It
would also be necessary to use much broader designs and
optimization under design constraints such as cost. Furthermore,
this work could also be adapted to domains of increasing concern
such as financial credit networks, whose structure may make them
vulnerable to bankruptcies [14,15].
Methods
Measuring Resilience
Research on graph theory has led to the development of a
variety of metrics of robustness or resilience [34] but here unlike in
many other studies the interest is in resilience to cascades and not
to disconnection. One particularly important and well-character-
ized class of cascades are those that start at a single node and then
spread probabilistically to neighboring nodes possibly reaching a
large fraction of the network, termed the SIR model and
percolation [26]. Under this model, resilience can be defined
based on the expected size of the surviving network:
R(G)~1{
1
n{1
E½extentof acascade , ð3Þ
where ‘‘extent of a cascade’’ refers to the ultimate number of new
cases created by a single failed node. For simplicity, cascades are
assumed to start at all nodes with uniform probability.
Measuring Efficiency
For many applications the distance between pairs of nodes in
the network is one of the most important determinants of the
network’s efficiency (see e.g. [32,35,36].) When nodes are
separated by short distances they can easily communicate and
distribute resources to each other. This idea motivates the
following ‘‘distance-attenuated reach’’ metric. For all pairs of
nodes u,v [V, weigh each pair by the inverse of its internal
distance (the number of edges in the shortest path from u to v)
taken to power g:
W(G)~
1
n(n{1)
X
u[V
X
v[V\fug
1
d(u,v)
g , ð4Þ
Normalization by n(n{1) ensures that 0ƒW(G)ƒ1, and only
the complete graph achieves 1. As usual, for any node v with
no path to u, set
1
d(u,v)
g ~0. The parameter g, ‘‘connectivity
attenuation’’ represents the rate at which distance decreases the
connectivity between nodes. In the experiments above g~1.
An appendix (File S1) is linked to this article. It contains detailed
information about the optimization methodology, the simula-
tion process, and sensitivity as well as rigorous justification of
quantitative claims.
Supporting Information
File S1 Optimizing topological cascade resilience based on the
structure of terrorist networks.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013448.s001 (1.11 MB
PDF)
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